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Innovation in Large and Small Firms
Kenneth J. Arrow

I. INTRODUCTION
This essay is intended to begin the elaboration of a theme: the interaction
between the observed sizes of firms and their internal decision making
procedures. This theme is a major one in the symphony of entrepreneurial
activity. The entrepreneur, as the maker and changer of economic and
productive life, is usually envisaged as an individual. In the neoclassical
tradition, he (or, rarely, she) is the lightning calculator, the individual who
rapidly scans the field of alternative productive processes and chooses the
opdmum'at any given set of prices. In the Austrian tradition, most notably
in the work of Schumpeter,' he is endowed with a special psychology that
makes him all the more an individual in the strict sense of the word; he cannot
be replaced by a machine or by a multiplicity of individuals, who would
inevitably slow him down. “He travels fastest who travels alone,” says an
ancient proverb.
However, the individual entrepreneur-proprietor does not loom nearly
as large today as suggested by these accounts. The large, even giant, firm
is a massive presence on the economic landscape. These large firms not only
predominate in the static allocation of resources, but are the sources of much
of the world’s change. They share fully with others as the sources and users
of innovations.
This is not to deny the continued importance of the relatively small firm
and the individual inventor. Indeed, the coexistence of large and small firms
is itself an interesting intellectual question. If, in fact, large firms do have
advantages over smaller ones, why are small firms not eliminated in the
competidve struggle? More generally, if there are differential advantages to
one size or another of firm, why do firms not converge to the optimal size?
The presence of large firms creates logical difficulties for the concept
of property and for the reward structure of the individual, as Berle and Means^
pointed out almost fifty years ago. The sharp calculating eye of the
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neoclassical entrepreneur was for his own profits, and even those who gave
a more psychological interpretation to entrepreneurial motives could hardly
deny that revenue was essential among them. But an employee, however
entrepreneurial in spirit, does not have property rights and cannot claim
profits, the residual revenues after contractual claims. Much ingenuity can
go into alternative compensation schemes, but the maker of decisions about
innovations can no longer be simply identified with the recipient of rewards
(and taker of losses) from them.
Of equal, or even greater, significance is the diffuse control structure
of the large firm. Essentially, no one can make decisions without limits even
within the framework of feasibility. Even a chief executive officer is restricted,
partly because of the need to adhere to well-defined operating procedures,
and partly because limits on span of control prevent him from making more
than a limited range of decisions with limited information. In large firms,
entrepreneurship has sociological as well as psychological and economic
dimensions.
The remarks thus far show that entrepreneurial activity, however
defined, operates in different ways in large firms than in small ones. I will
concentrate here on entrepreneurship as Schumpeter conceived it—the
process of innovation. The basic decisions are the recognition of promising
ideas and the financing of their development. We want to discuss how these
decisions operate in firms of varying sizes.
An economist would not, of course, discuss any issues of decision
making by firms without taking account of market relations. Since the
development of innovations is an investment, the most relevant market is
the capital market. However, innovations are, by their nature, rather odd
commodities from a neoclassical viewpoint; they tend to be indivisible. Their
development is attended by uncertainty; if everything about an innovation
were known, it would not be an innovation. What is still more, the properties
and economic potential of an innovation are by its nature likely to be better
known to the innovator than to a prospective source of financing.
In short, the supply of capital for innovation is not modeled well by
conventional competitive market theory. Indeed, most of the analysis in this
chapter will center about the methods of financing innovation and their
implications.
The chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, I review in the
sketchiest way the idea that large firms are really significant in the economy
and constitute a phenomenon about which we cannot be indifferent. I then
describe an idealized model of the process of innovation (oversimplified of
course) designed to serve as a basis for subsequent discussion. The heart of
the paper follows, an attempt to understand the factors in the decision to
innovate and (what is essentially equivalent) the financing of the innovative
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activity. In particular, I stress the systematic variation of these decisions with
firm size and complexity. It is concluded that there is likely to be tendency
tov^ard specialization, less costly and more original innovations v^ill come
from small firms, and those involving higher development costs but less
radical departures in principle v^^ill come from larger firms. This
specialization creates opportunities for trade, as all specialization does; in
this case, the trade will frequently be in firms as such; that is, takeovers and
mergers.
II.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LARGE FIRMS

From the popular viewpoint, the concentration of economic power is one
of the most obvious aspects of the economic world. In mainstream
neoclassical economics, it hardly appears, especially in more abstract versions
of the neoclassical system (for instance. Arrow and Hahn).^ Of course, the
presence of natural monopoly is recognized, and this is the basis for the
doctrine of price regulation. Even here, many economists consider that there
is sufficient competition from substitute products to make natural monopoly
an unimportant concept.
The trouble is that the analytic tools of neoclassical economics are not
well adapted to departures from perfect competition. There are two pillars
to the edifice: the optimizing behavior of the firm and household, and the
equilibrating forces of the markets that link them. Optimizing behavior can
indeed be discussed under conditions of market power; the theory of
monopoly is rich in implications. But the concept of imperfectly competitive
markets is very hard to define. Various ad hoc constructions, such as
Chamberlin’s notion of monopolistic competition'*, have appeared, but they
suffer from inconsistencies. Game theory has supplied a formal framework
that, in principle, replaces markets by more general forms of interactions,
but it has not yet succeeded in producing a general theory comparable in
power to the theory of general competitive equilibrium.
Hence, there is a bias toward analyzing the competitive case. As we
know, this analysis requires, if taken literally, that the production possibility
sets be convex. In particular, it requires constant or diminishing returns to
scale. The latter case suggests a bias toward small firms; under free entry,
the smaller the better. Constant returns, on the other hand, are neutral toward
the size of firms. If two firms merge, the owners will (under perfect
competition) be neither better off nor worse off than they were before. Under
perfect markets, including perfect capital markets, the profits of two different
activities will simply be additive.
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A good deal of the empirical literature on firm sizes has been devoted
to arguing that the competitive model is adequate in practice; that is, there
are not many markets dominated by one or two firms. This may well be true;
it follows that the static efficiency characteristics of competitive equilibrium
can be postulated to hold in the real world. This is very far from denying
the existence of very large firms or from explaining this phenomenon.
For it is certainly a fact. Depending on what measures you use, 500
firms constitute half or more of the nonagricultural economy.* It is frequendy
argued that the indices of concentration have not shown much secular rise,
at least not for 75 years or so. However, this misses the point. The economy
has grown enormously in this period. If it were merely a question of
replication, that is, if the economy were expanding homogeneously, we
would expect the number of firms to increase in the same proportion. Since
firms differ in size, for whatever reason, we would expect the proportion of
firms of a given size to be constant, while the total number increases.
To be sure, the expansion of the economy has not been merely a
replication. The fact that per capita income is rising and, more strongly, that
factor productivity (output per unit input) is or was rising, implies a change
in the proportions of the economy. But one component of growth in the market
remains sheer population-size or total factor supply (capital and labor). One
might expect then, that the number of firms would be proportional to the
extensive growth of the economy (its size in population or inputs), while the
size of each firm might be expected to grow with the intensive growth (for
example, output per capital or per unit factor supply). This is what has
happened (roughly) to the distribution of individual income. It can be
expressed as the constancy of the Lorenz curve; that is, the proportion of total
income received by a given proportion of the population arrayed by income
level (for example, the upper tenth of income recipients) is a constant.
But this is not what has happened with the distribution of firm sizes.
The proportion of total sales or income received by a fixed number of firms
has more or less remained constant.^ Therefore, the proportion of income
received by a fixed proportion of firms starting from the top (say, an upper
decile again) has increased.
In short, we find that the size of each firm has increased more than
proportionally to intensive growth. If intensive growth is identified with
productivity (either of labor or of total inputs), it follows that not only the
outputs but also the inputs of the average firm have risen. This implies that
the forces determining the sizes of firms ( in particular the economies of scale
and the size of the market) have so shifted as to make larger firms more
advantageous.
The increasing costs of innovation are a possible candidate, and the later
analysis in this chapter implicitly makes the case for this proposition. At
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this point, however, I only wish to establish that there has been a significant
shift to larger sizes of firms and that this shift has systematic economic
consequences and causes.
One obvious feature of larger firms (as contrasted with smaller
contemporary firms or even with the same firms when they were smaller)
is that they are more complex. They are not simply scale expansions of
smaller firms, any more than the economy as a whole is a scale expansion
of its earlier historical self. Even if the added activities are similar in nature
to original ones, random fluctuations would make coordinating activities
profitable. More broadly, growth usually involves disaggregation of activities
and differentiation of products and activities.^ No doubt these tendencies can
ultimately be explained in terms of indivisibilities and other causes of
inaeasing returns to scale. The complexity requires additional control
functions at the central level.*
Coordinating activities themselves are costly; not only do they directly
involve the use of resources (managerial and supporting personnel,
associated equipment, space, and communication channels), but they also
impose costs upon decision making at lower levels by creating delays and
requiring additional communication costs. They are undertaken because the
costs of coordination are exceeded by the benefits.^ As Coase has argued, these
benefits are relevant only if they are not obtainable by coordinating separate
activities in the marketplace, through prices.
This point can be emphasized by considering the multidivisional firm
and the role of transfer pricing. A large firm is organized into profit centers,
each of which operates as virtually a separate firm. Transactions between
them are market transactions, and payments between them are made at
current market prices or (if no suitable market exists) at transfer prices
mimicking market prices. Presumably the opportunities for direct (as
opposed to market oriented) coordination of activities have been exhausted
within the profit centers. What distinguishes the large firm, however, from
a collection of smaller firms is that many resource-allocation decisions are
still make at a central level, particularly capital formation. A profit center
is responsible for its own decisions on current flows, but in general it cannot
make its own investment decisions, except possibly for very trivial ones.
Indeed, it is surprising how often decisions on investment require the
approval of the Board of Directors, while decisions of at least equal
importance relating to pricing and production are decentralized to much
lower levels.
There is, in short, an internal centralized mechanism for allocating
available investment funds to specific projects among the various profit
centers. The internal capital-allocation mechanism is not, properly speaking,
a market; that is, a profit center cannot borrow any amount at a fixed rate
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of interest. Rather, the project it proposes must be examined by the allocating
authority for feasibility and profitability.
It would not be correct to contrast this allocation mechanism with an
external capital market thought of as a true market in the textbook sense.
Much, though not all, external financing is also project-specific and rationed.
A bank does not lend by buying securities from anonymous sellers, but by
lending to particular firms and individuals and often by looking at the
particular project that the lender wishes to finance.
(We will not here study why capital allocation is so largely centralized,
even in an otherwise decentralized firm. Part of the reason, certainly, must
be the relatively slow feedback. The head of a profit center is not personally
liable for the costs of bad investments. Considering job mobility, he may
not be around to take any consequences when an investment is realized.)
It is important to distinguish the existence or absence of an internal
capital allocation (in this sense) from the presence or absence of extemal
financing. The supply of capital available for internal allocation can come
either from retained profits in the various profit centers or from the outside.
Large firms in general have an advantage in access to the outside capital
market. One reason is the principle of insurance. Investing as they do in a
variety of projects, their earnings are apt to be more stable and, therefore,
the riskiness of their securities is reduced. Another reason is an economy of
scale in attention and information-gathering from the viewpoint of the
suppliers of funds. A large firm is a greater demander, and it therefore pays
potential investors to concentrate their attention on that firm’s activities
rather than scattering it in one-shot transactions over many firms, for each
of which there will be relatively little opportunity to use the information.
Diversification of activities also implies a more stable source of internal
funds. Hence, in general, large firms will have a disproportionately larger
and more stable internal capital supply than smaller firms will.
III.

A MODEL OF THE INNOVATION PROCESS

Innovations are infinitely variable; indeed, they include all alterations in
knowledge of current production relations between inputs and outputs. Most
are very small, but those are not the ones we are concerned with here. We
wish to stress those large enough that deliberate decisions are needed to
proceed along the path of innovation. An innovation may never be realized
as a product; if it is so realized, it may not remain in production very long.
The process of innovation is, virtually by definition, filled with uncertainty;
it is a journey of exploration into a strange land.
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We take as a primitive of the system a stream of concepts—ideas for
innovation. These occur to individuals both within firms and elsewhere. A
concept may or may not prove to be feasible. If it is feasible, it may or may
not prove to be profitable. These determinations require investment, and it
is these investment decisions that we are investigating.
For simplicity, we will distinguish two further stages after the concept,
those of research and of development. Somewhat arbitrarily, we will think
of research as determining the feasibility of the concept and development
as determining its profitability.
In this model, the concepts are random events, not controllable and
unaffected by policy. They will, of course, depend on many factors, but
especially on the state of knowledge in the relevant specialty. This in turn,
may be influenced by previous innovations in the same intellectual area.
Decisions are made at the next two stages. First, research is needed to
determine if the concept can be translated into actuality. The research may
be more or less costly to carry out. When it is completed, it yields information
about the prospects for development in the following sense. At the start of
the development process, there will be a relation between the profitability
of the innovation when it is finally introduced (possibly zero or even negative)
and the amount invested in development. This relation depends on the
information gathered in the research phase;that is, the profitability of the
innovation at any given level of development expenditure with vary will the
information obtained from research. Further, the relation of profitability to
development cost is uncertain even given the research outcome.
To put it in a slightly different language, the research outcome is
purchased by the research expenditure. The profitability of innovation after
development is a random variable with a probability distribution conditional
on both the research outcome and the decision about development
expenditure. Given this distribution, the firm has the problem of choosing
the optimal development expenditure. The optimal level might be (and
frequendy is) zero; but if it is not zero, it is frequently a very large amount.
In this simple model, there are two points at which decisions are made:
(1) to engage in resecurch and (2) to determine the optimal level of
development expenditure. In the first decision, the information potentially
available to the decision makers consists of the concept and publicly available
information. In the second, it consists of the concept and the research
outcome together with publicly available information. Of course, this
oversimplifies the process in many ways. The sharp distinction between
research and development is overstated. Furthermore, the development
process itself is sequential. Instead of a single decision establishing
development expenditures for an entire project, there are repeated
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reassessments based on information revealed by the development process
itself. However, our simplification will be adequate for our purposes here.
What must be insisted upon is the privacy of the information and its
relation to the locus of decision making. The two relevant pieces of
information, to repeat, are the initial concept and the research outcome. They
are received in the first instance by some particular individuals. If these
individuals were the decision makers, there would be no difficulty in
principle. The decisions made (to engage in research and to choose the
optimal level of development expenditures) would be optimal given the
information available.
But the individuals concerned are members of organizations, small or
large. The decisions to be made involve the allocation of resources. Some
of these decisions might be structurally delegated to them. However, as the
amounts involved increase, there will be more and more need for approval
at higher levels. The internal capital-allocation mechanism will become
involved. Those in the lower levels who have the relevant information cannot
make the final decisions. Their scope of authority is often restricted to
making recommendations.
The important question then becomes, how is the information initially
available communicated to the capital-allocation mechanisms? There are
two classes of reasons why information cannot be conveyed without cost;
(1) communication channels have limited capacity; and (2) there are incentive
effects that reduce the reliability of information transmission.
1. The specialists who have the concepts and undertake the research have
more knowledge of the context than others. An engineer has had
training that may not be available to the generalist who allocates
resources. Thus, any information conveyed will not be understood as
well by the recipient as by the sender. Further, the specialists have spent
more time with the project than could any reviewing agency. The
agency has too many other responsibilities. The capacity to absorb
information is always limited. Hence, again there is a degradation of
information with transmission.
There may, to be sure, be situations in which the central
mechanism has better inform ation in some respects than the
specialists. It might have better knowledge of other similar concepts
and might well have better understanding of the commercial, as
opposed to technical, possibilities. However, there will always be a
degradation of the technical information, so that the probability
distribution of outcomes of the development process (for given
development costs) will on the average be wider.
2. Within a given firm it may be assumed, as a first approximation, that
there is no distortion of the information; the specialist presents the
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information as well as he or she can. However, if information has to
cross the boundaries of the firm (for instance, to attract capital from
outside investors), the incentive increases to present information
misleadingly. Negative aspects might be slurred over, probabilities of
success exaggerated.
As a second approximation, there can be some distortion even
within the firm. There is some incentive to increase the importance
of one’s work, to make it appear more valuable in potentiality and
thereby earn material and nonmaterial rewards. As in any investment
activity, the individual bears limited financial responsibility for
failure. Furthermore, for research and development over extended
periods of time, the feedback is so slow that the individual is not apt
to be in the same position when the program shows results. Finally,
the responsibility for success and failure in any position, but especially
in one involving such uncertainties as those of research and
development, is very hard to assess. That a project failed by no means
proves that it should not have been undertaken.
From these considerations, the following implications may be drawn:
1. When responsibility for decisions on research and development is
shared because of a need for approval of capital expenditures, the
information used in making these decisions is apt to be degraded from
its initial state.
2. The longer the chain of communication involved in the approval of
projects, the more the information is apt to be degraded.
3. When the chain of communication crosses the boundary of the firm,
the degradation of information is apt to be much more severe.**
IV. TH E DECISION TO INNOVATE AND FIRM SIZE
We can now draw the threads of the analysis together. In particular, the
different strategic responses of small firms and large firms to the emergence
of research concepts will be analyzed. For simplicity, I speak as if there were
just two discrete sizes of firm; of course, there is a continuum of firm sizes
and a parallel continuum of innovation strategies.
Innovation has been described as a two-stage decision process. As usual,
the appropriate analysis must proceed in reverse order of time. That is, we
must first study the decision on development expenditure given the research
concept and the research outcome, then analyze the decision to engage in
research.
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Suppose, then, that we compare a large and a small firm, both of which
engaged in research starting from the same concept and observed the same
research outcome. The small firm is well informed about the development
possibility function; that is, the function relating expected profitability to
a given level of development expenditures. It can therefore calculate an
optimal level of development expenditures. However, if the amount is large
enough, it will not be able to finance it from its own capital funds. It could
seek capital from outside. Assume, however, that it has fully utilized whatever
general borrowing power it has. Then it has to seek financing based on the
project itself. However, for reasons adduced in the last section, the
transmission of information across the boundary of the firm will he
accompanied by considerable degradation. It follows that capital will he
available from the outside only on unfavorable terms (if at all) so that the
scale of development expenditures will be less than optimal. Indeed, if the
amount of development funds required is very large, it will be essentially
impossible to finance the project by borrowing.
A small firm can in many cases obtain outside financing by sale of
equity. When the amounts involved are large relative to the initial size of
the firm, the transaction amounts to selling the development prospects and
is likely to be accompanied by a change in control. (I will take up the
possibility of sale of research findings in the next section.)
A large firm facing the same research concept and research outcome
will have much less severe restrictions on funding. However, as usual in
economic affairs, there is no pure gain without offsets. The difficulties of
communication with an external capital market are replaced by those of
communicating with the internal capital-allocation mechanism. As we have
seen, the information loss in the large firm is greater than that in the small
firm, but less than that involved in reaching the external market. Therefore,
the larger firm will tend to invest suboptimally in development expenditures.
However, it will do better than the small firm for large development
expenditures that the large firm can finance but the small firm cannot. It
will do less well on expenditures small enough for a small firm to finance.
As an additional hypothesis, it might be supposed that the information
loss in the large firm is greater for proposals with greater novelty. The prior
information of the internal capital-allocation mechanism may not equip it
to evaluate novelties very well. The smaller firm, having less information
loss, may be able to accept greater novelty more easily (provided it can finance
the development process). Hence, there may be a bias against greater
originality in large firms.
It may be objected that a large firm is not more capable of financing
large expenditures than a small one. It has larger resources, but it also has
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larger demands of all kinds. Hence, it is no more capable of financing a given
large expenditure for development than the small firm, as it has other large
development expenditures competing for the scarce funds. This is an
important point. But there are at least two reasons v^hy we would expect
the financing ability of large firms to grow more than proportionately to
their size: (1) as we have already seen, large firms have disproportionate access
to the external capital market without reference to specific projects. Hence,
the pool of available capital is more than proportionately larger. Further
(as also noted) the size of the financing available is likely to be statistically
steadier, decreasing the probability that a demand for a large amount of
development expenditures will coincide with a transient shortage of capital
funds. (2) If there are a number of potential demands for development
expenditures, the demand will also be statistically steadier. There is a high
probability that an above-average demand for development expenditures in
one area will be offset by a below- average demand in another. This potential
offsetting is less available in small firms.
Basically, then, the superiority of large firms in financing rests on the
operations of the insurance principle, though it is aided by economies of
information to companies that supply capital to the large firms.
We have first analyzed in dynamic programming form the effects of
firm size on the development decision, given the outcome of the research
phase. From the above reasoning, for each research concept and each research
outcome there is an expenditure on development and a probability
distribution of profitabilities in production. These will be affected (as
indicated) both by the development profitability function and by the
availability of capital, which is conditioned by the problems of information
transmission. Hence, there will be a probability distribution of anticipated
profitabilities taking account of both development expenditures and
subsequent profitabilities in production. It has been argued that, on the
average, small firms will be superior if the optimal development costs are
low and large firms will be superior if costs are large.
Now consider the decision to engage in research. (Again, for the time
being, ignore the possibility that the research outcome can be sold.) Before
engaging in research, the development profitability function is itself
unknown; nevertheless there will be expectations of it. In probability
language, the development profitability function (itself a random variable
expressing the distribution of profitability in production conditional on
development expenditures) is taken as conditional on research outcome after
that is known and as unconditional (more precisely, conditional on research
concept but not on outcome) before research is undertaken.
Given the research concept, it may be expected (though without
certainty) that subsequent development expenditures will be low if the
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project is at all feasible. In that case, it follows that small firms will be more
likely to undertake the research than large firms. The opposite is the case
if the unconditional distribution implies that development expenditures are
likely to be high. Already at the point where the decisions to undertake
research are made, there is ^fferential selection among firms of differing sizes.
Thus, on the average one would expect firms to specialize in projects
whose optimal development scales are correlated with the size of the firm.
Projects anticipated to lead to large expenditures will on the whole be less
than optimally funded, because large firms have higher transmission losses
for information.
If the supplementary hypothesis advanced above is correct (that larger
firms will find it harder to allocate capital to very novel ventures), then it
is also true that very novel research concepts will be less likely to lead to
research projects in large firms than in small.
Finally, it must be pointed out that the correlation in research
undertaken between firm size and optimal level of development expenditures,
though positive, will be far from perfect. The level of development
expenditures, as repeatedly emphasized, will depend on the research
outcome. Research, by its nature, is uncertain. It can easily happen that a
research program is undertaken with a probability distribution of optimal
development expenditures whose expectation is relatively small before the
research outcome is observed. The distribution conditional on research
outcome may be quite different, possibly with a large expectation. This is
a far from rare event. Of course, the opposite can also occur. If the correct
distributions are held, it must occur comparably frequently.
It can therefore happen that a small firm undertakes a line of research
whose outcome would optimally involve a much larger development
expenditure than it is prepared to undertake. It will either pursue the
development on a much smaller scale than optimal, or it will discontinue
it altogether if there are sufficient increasing returns to scale in the
development process.
V.

A MARKET FOR RESEARCH OUTCOMES

This concluding section seeks to remove one limitation of the preceding.
The research outcome may itself be the object of a market transaction. Selling
ideas is not entirely as simple as selling goods, but they are valuable to at
least some potential buyers. Establishment and transfer of properly rights
can take several forms. The research outcome might be patentable, in which
case the sale is straightforward. Alternatively, the buyer might value a whole
constellation of working knowledge embodied in the firm. In that case, the
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sale of the research outcome could be equivalent to the sale of the whole
firm.
From the discussion thus far, the natural sellers of research outcomes
would be small firms that, after observing the outcome, determine that
optimal expenditures on development exceed the financial capacity of the
firm. In view of the uncertainty about development costs at the moment of
the research concept, such situations can arise easily. The buyers might be
individuals or groups of individuals in the external capital market who wish
to secure their investment in such an uncertain situation by equity
acquisition rather than bonds. More likely, however, it is the large firms in
similar fields who constitute the natural demand side of the innovation
market, whether research outcomes are sold in the form of patents or of whole
firms.
The existence of markets for research outcomes alters the incentive
structures for undertaking research within both large and small firms. For
small firms, it lessens the inhibition on starting research for which large
development expenditures are likely. If this came to pass, they do not find
the research useless; they can sell the outcome to a large firm. One must still
reckon with a loss of information as it passes across the boundaries between
the large and small firms. Hence, the incentives for the research are less than
they would be within the large firm. Since the large firm is well informed,
it is also true that the loss of information is less than it would be between
the small firm and the general external-capital market, so that the possibility
of sale to large firms is not negligible, as we have assumed the external
financing of expensive developments by small firms to be.
The existence of markets for research outcomes also alters the incentives
for research within large firms - for the worse. For now the firm has an
altemative supply of research outcomes on which to base its development
of innovations. The constraints on its total development expenditures imply
that anticipated availability of research outcomes on the market will reduce
the incentive to use only internally generated research outcomes. There are
limits to relying on the market for research inputs into the development
process. For example, internal research capability is complementary to
externally purchased research outcomes. It is needed to evaluate them and
to synthesize them with other research outcomes, whether internal or
external. But clearly some substitution takes place.
If this analysis is meaningful, it suggests a division of labor according
to frmi size. Small firms will tend to specialize more in the research phase and
in smaller development processes. Larger firms will devote a much smaller
proportion of their research and development budget to the research phase.
They will specialize in the larger developments and will buy a considerable
fraction of the research basis for their subsequent development of innovations.
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While anecdotes are no substitute for good statistical analysis, a striking
number of innovations have been produced by giant corporations on the
basis of ideas (and perhaps some production) from small firms.
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In order not to interrupt the main line of the argument, I have left rather vague the
concept of the profitability of the innovation, which appears as an output of the
development process. It is not necessary that the innovation give rise to market power—
that is, that it be a commodity with some distinct differentiation from others and on
which, therefore, a monopoly profit can be earned. (Of course, this possibility is not
excluded either.) But even if the product, or a close substitute, is one already produced,
an innovation may amount to a cost reduction. Hence, the firm w ill earn a rent on
the superior productivity induced by the innovation. It must be recognized, however,
that the knowledge embodied in an innovation cannot fully be made property. It is
apt to be copied by others, and, as the knowledge spreads, the price of the product
w ill decline. Hence, the anticipated profitability must take account of the declining
rent from the innovation.

